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We demonstrate that minority mechanisms arise in the dynamics of markets because of price
impact; accordingly the relative importance of minority and delayed majority mechanisms depends
on the frequency of trading. We then use mixed majority/minority games to illustrate that a
vanishing price return auto-correlation function does not necessarily imply market efficiency. On the
contrary, we stress the difference between correlations measured conditionally and unconditionally
on external patterns.
Whether financial markets are predictable or not is a
debate whose origin can be traced back to Bachelier’s
hypothesis that prices follow a random walk [1]. Later
work, in particular by Fama [2] and Samuelson [3] aimed
at proving mathematically that markets are efficient, i.e.
unpredictable, grounding their theories on perfect ratio-
nality. This is indeed the simplest view of a financial
market, and a very convenient one. There are however
good reasons to believe that markets are not perfectly
efficient. The well-known January effect is a systematic
deviation from efficiency and has been observed in real
markets for many years, but is reportedly disappearing;
other examples include the predictive power of moving
averages [4]. According to more recent theoretical stud-
ies, the cost of acquiring information [5] or the presence
of noise traders [6] prohibits perfect efficiency, as perfect
information can only be achieved at an infinite cost, or by
accepting a considerable risk; this leads to the hypothesis
of marginally efficient markets, where most of the easily
detectable predictability is removed by traders.
Market efficiency is often illustrated by the fact that
the price return auto-correlation function is essentially
zero. Denoting the log-price at time t by p(t), the price
return is defined as r(t) = p(t+ 1)− p(t), and assuming
that r(t) is a stationary process, its auto-correlation reads
C(τ) =
(〈r(t + τ)r(t)〉 − 〈r(t)〉2) /〈r(t)2〉. (1)
Here 〈· · ·〉 stands for averages over time; note that we
normalise by the averagemagnitude of returns. The units
of time are arbitrary in this paper. If C(τ) 6= 0, statis-
tically significant predictions of future price changes are
possible on time-scales τ , that is, the knowledge of r(t)
allows to make probabilistic statements about r(t + τ).
The analysis of real market data shows that C(τ) ≈ 0
typically for τ larger than a few minutes [7, 8, 9]. How-
ever, the existing correlations on shorter time-scales are
not exploitable in reality because of transaction costs [9].
This apparent efficiency however does not deter some
practitioners from making statistically abnormal prof-
its. In this paper we argue that the correlation function
as defined in Eq. (1) is a poor measure of predictabil-
ity. It is indeed an unconditional measure of correlation
and does not differentiate between technical analysis pat-
terns, states of the market or of the economy. Finding
and exploiting relevant information patterns generates
arbitrage opportunities. As a consequence, correlation
functions conditional on these patterns have to be used.
In the following we will use agent-based market models
in which patterns play an essential role, to illustrate the
differences between measures of correlation in price time
series which are conditional or unconditional on these
patterns.
PATTERNS
We now formalise the notions of conditional and un-
conditional averages as introduced above. Assume for ex-
ample that there are P patterns µ = 1, · · · , P which are
relevant (or believed to be relevant) for the behaviour of
the market. The pattern or state of the market at time t
will be denoted by µ(t). Furthermore we will assume for
simplicity that all patterns occur with equal probability
1/P . Such patterns can then potentially be used in order
to predict future price changes and in this sense money
making consists essentially in identifying a suitable set
of patterns and in exploiting the resulting predictability
conditional on a given pattern, if it is present.
The average return conditional on µ will be denoted by
〈r|µ〉 in the following, that is the time average < · · · |µ >
is only performed over instances t for which µ(t) = µ.
If at time t, µ(t) = µ, r(t) is statistically predictable if
|〈r|µ〉| > 0; in addition, if |〈r|µ〉| > c where c denotes the
transaction cost, the price return predictability given µ
2can be exploited [41]. We will neglect transaction costs in
our discussion. Given a set of P states, the predictability,
H , can now be defined as follows [42]
H =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈r|µ〉2. (2)
Note that H measures the average predictability of the
next price return. This means that the time horizon over
which this predictability can be exploited is fixed, and
equal to the time interval over which returns are defined.
In addition, H fails to measure predictability associated
with oscillatory behaviour. The latter is captured instead
by the conditional price return auto-correlation function
K(τ) defined as follows
K(τ) =
(
1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈r(t)r(t + τ)|µ〉 −H
)
/〈r(t)2〉. (3)
Here 〈r(t)r(t + τ)|µ〉 measures the correlation of price
returns between two occurrences of a given pattern µ,
i.e. we impose µ(t) = µ(t + τ) = µ when taking the
above average. Although H is a measure for conditional
predictability, K can provide additional predictability,
as we will see agent based market models can display
regimes in which H vanishes, but where at the same time
K is non-zero. Secondly, K is of interest when the signal-
to-noise (or Sharpe) ratio H/(〈r2〉 −H) is small, that is,
when it is likely that for a fixed µ, A changes sign between
two occurences of that pattern.
The aim of the present paper is not to identify sets
of predictability patterns in real market time series (see
e.g. [39] for a method of extracting patterns from real
market data). We shall rather illustrate the difference
between conditional and unconditional measures of pre-
dictability in agent-based models and will accordingly fo-
cus on models which are able to capture the relationship
between predictability and price return auto-correlation.
Agent-based models of financial market are appealing be-
cause they make it possible to study the relationship
between the behaviour of the agents and the statisti-
cal properties of the resulting price time series. Early
studies [10, 11, 12, 13] showed that such models are
able to reproduce some typical market-like data, so-called
stylized facts. Recently, modified Minority Games [14]
where the agents are allowed not to play if they do not
believe to be able to make money, exhibit similar fea-
tures [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Such models are on the bor-
derline of being exactly solvable by methods of statisti-
cal physics, while showing non-trivial realistic behaviour,
and are hence of interest to both economists and statis-
tical physicists. Volatility clustering obtained in agent
based models has been related to strategy switching [20],
and large price returns to market efficiency [19].
PRICE EVOLUTION, MINORITY AND
MAJORITY GAMES
Before turning to specific agent-based models we first
define a price evolution mechanism and reward structure.
Let us concentrate on one given trader who opens a po-
sition a at time t, which can be either long (a = 1), or
short (a = −1). After some waiting time, say at time
t′ > t, the same trader closes his position. His gain is
therefore given by
a[p(t′ + 1)− p(t+ 1)], (4)
as p(t+1) and p(t′+1) are the prices at which the trans-
actions take place. We assume that the excess demand
at times t and t′ are given by A(t) (which includes a),
and A(t′) (which includes −a), respectively. It is reason-
able to suppose that the excess demand A(t) has a price
impact of f [A(t)], i.e. that p(t+ 1) = p(t) + f [A(t)]. For
convenience, we will consider a simple linear price impact
function f(x) = x/λ, where λ is the liquidity [29]. We
will set λ = 1 without loss of generality. Therefore, the
gain of this trader in this round trip reads
a[p(t′ + 1)− p(t+ 1)] = −(−a)A(t′)− aA(t)
+a[p(t′)− p(t)]. (5)
The first two terms on the right hand side are typical of
a minority game payoff, in which this trader is rewarded
if his action a is that of the minority at that time, i.e.,
the payoff −aA(t) is positive whenever a and A(t) have
opposite signs. The last term represents the payoff that
could be obtained if there were no price impact; its na-
ture is that of a cumulative and delayed majority game.
In other words, because of price impact, the market is
a minority game when positions are opened or closed.
When a position is held, the market is a retarded ma-
jority game, as it is favourable to hold a long position
whenever the price is increasing (A > 0) and vice versa.
As a consequence, the relative importance of minority
and majority mechanisms depends on the frequency of
trading. The Minority Game [14] imposes to trade at
each time step, and hence focuses on price impact.
The first paper to apply the minority game frame-
work to a two time-step payoff is [15], where the pay-
off at time t is a[Nin(t) − Nin(t − 1)], Nin(t) being
the number of people with a long position at time t
(no short position is allowed) and is similar to our
price p(t); therefore, this payoff can be translated into
a(t)A(t+ 1). The idea is to reward people for anticipat-
ing the crowd. Later work [21, 22] explicitly rewarded
the agents with a(t)A(t+ 1), allowing also for short sell-
ing; games with this type of payoff are often referred to
as ’$-games’. Eq. (5) therefore extends previous work
in two crucial aspects: first by adding the holding of a
position over several time steps and secondly by consid-
ering price impact. The former is reflected by payoffs
3a(t)A(t), a(t)A(t+ 1), · · · , a(t)A(t′ − 1), i.e. a total gain
of a(t) [A(t′ − 1) + . . .+A(t)] = a(t) [p(t′)− p(t)] while
holding the position, and price impact leads to the terms
−a(t)A(t) and −a(t′)A(t′). It should be noted that equa-
tion (5) states that the real gain from a round-trip is
composed of a sum of sequential payoffs; therefore it also
contains a description of how profits and losses (P&L)
and trading strategy gains are to be updated in real time.
Exact solutions for models with two-time step payoffs
are currently unavailable, but sometimes an understand-
ing of their qualitative properties is possible (e.g. [21]).
Although realistic speculative trading inevitably involves
two or more time-steps, the perception of price dynamics
by the agents can be captured by models involving only
one-step payoffs: Ref. [23] derives the $-game (which
does not include price impact) rigorously and argues that
different players can have different types of one-step pay-
offs depending on their a priori beliefs on the market: it
concludes that fundamentalists, or value traders, believe
that the market is a minority game, while trend-followers
believe it to be a majority game. Thus, it is possible
to consider a simple market with constant proportions
of fundamentalists and trend-followers, respectively, that
is, a mixed population of minority and majority players.
An analysis along the lines of [23] can be applied to the
last term of Eq (5) of course, taking into account possible
different beliefs of the agents on the future behaviour of
the market. This procedure would not, however, lead to
one-step payoffs as the two market impact terms would
not disappear.
Since mixed minority/majority game models are ex-
actly dynamically solvable [23, 24, 25], they will be the
focus of this paper (see [26] for a model of speculation
based on Eq (5)).
MINORITY/MAJORITY GAMES: DEFINITION
A minority/majority game describes an ensemble of N
agents, each of whom at every time-step has to take one
of two possible actions, labelled by −1 and +1. We will
denote the choice of agent i at time t by ai(t). The excess
demand is A(t) =
∑N
j=1 aj(t). The payoff given to agent
i is
φiai(t)A(t), (6)
where φi = 1 if agent i is a trend follower, thus prefers
to be in the majority; conversely, if φi = −1, agent i
is a fundamentalist, and plays a minority game: he is
rewarded if his action ai(t) has the opposite sign of the
total bid A(t) [23]. We assume that there is a constant
fraction θ of minority players, so that choosing θ ∈ [0, 1]
allows to interpolate between pure majority populations
(θ = 0) and pure minority games (θ = 1). We adopt the
assumption of a linear price impact function as above so
that price returns are taken to be proportional to the
excess demand A.
Games without patterns
As a warm-up we first compute the price return auto-
correlation function of models without patterns as they
are simple and analytically tractable. The adaptation
abilities of the agents follow a simple rule: agent i com-
putes the cumulative payoff, i.e the score of action +1,
denoted by ∆i(t); at time t his trading decision is prob-
abilistic:
P (ai(t) = 1) =
1 + φi tanh(Γ∆i(t))
2
. (7)
The scores themselves evolve according to
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t) +A(t)/N. (8)
This defines a reinforcement learning known as the Logit
model in economics [27] and corresponds to Boltzmann
weights in statistical physics [43]. Γ is a learning rate.
Note that if φi = 1 a large score ∆i will lead to a
preference for action ai(t) = 1, while minority players
(φi = −1) will predominantly play ai(t) = −1 if they
find a positive ∆i.
Minority games without patterns were introduced in
[28], while pattern-less mixed minority/majority games
are first found in [23]. If all the agents have the same
initial score valuation ∆i(0) = ∆(0), all the ∆i are equal
at all times, hence one can drop the index i in Eq. (8).
A(t) is then the sum of N independent identically dis-
tributed variables. In particular A(t)/N converges to
(1 − 2θ) tanh(Γ∆) for large N . This means that in this
limit the dynamics of ∆ is well described by
∆(t+ 1) = ∆(t) + (1− 2θ) tanh(Γ∆(t)). (9)
In the majority regime (θ < 1/2), one has 1−2θ > 0 so
that ∆ converges to ±∞: all the majority players agree
on a common decision and are happy, while the minority
players agree on the opposite decision and are equally
happy: this is a Nash equilibrium. A is constant; more
precisely, |A|
N
= (1−2θ), therefore 〈A(t)A(t+1)〉
N2
= (1−2θ)2,
which is confirmed by simulations, see Fig. 1.
The minority game regime (θ > 1/2) is slightly more
complicated, as Eq. (9) has a unique fixed point which
depends on Γ(2θ − 1). If Γ(2θ − 1) < 2, the fixed point
∆∗ = 0 is stable and unique, leading to 〈A〉 = 0 [23]; this
also implies that 〈A(t)A(t + 1)〉 = 0. On the other hand,
if Γ(2θ − 1) > 2, ∆ = 0 becomes unstable, and a period
two dynamics emerges [23]. The oscillation amplitude of
∆(t) = (−1)t∆∗ is determined by
∆∗ =
(2θ − 1)
2
tanh(Γ∆∗), (10)
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FIG. 1: Autocorrelation function 〈A(t)A(t+ 1)〉/N2 as a
function of the fraction of minority players θ for Γ = 3 (di-
amonds), 5 (circles), and 100 (triangles); N = 101, 10000
iterations. Continuous lines are theoretical predictions.
which has of course two solutions of opposite signs. Ne-
glecting fluctuations around ∆∗, the resulting one-step
correlation function is
〈A(t)A(t + 1)〉
N2
≃ −[(2θ − 1) tanh(Γ∆∗)]2. (11)
In Fig. 1 we show 〈A(t)A(t + 1)〉/N2 computed from nu-
merical simulations of the mixed minority/majority game
without patterns, and compare the results with the sim-
ple approximation of Eq. (11). We find that both are
in good agreement. As discussed in Refs. [23, 29], the
sign of 〈A(t)A(t + 1)〉 reveals the minority/majority na-
ture of the market, that is, the fraction of value investors
and trend followers: if the correlation function is posi-
tive majority players dominate and vice versa. As the
outcome of the game in the majority regime is constant,
its auto-correlation C(1) = 0. The case of the minority
regime is more interesting: as 〈A〉 = 0, the agents cannot
predict the next outcome; in addition, if Γ(2θ − 1) ≤ 2,
its correlation function C(1) = 0, hence, the game is re-
ally unpredictable; if Γ(2θ − 1) > 2 and its correlation
function C(1) < 0 measures predictability that cannot
be exploited by the agents defined above, but could be
by more sophisticated agents that would have strategies
taking into account correlations.
Games with patterns
When the agents believe that the next outcome of the
game depends on some information such as economic
forecast, the price history or the number of sun spots,
their trading actions at time t will depend on the pat-
tern µ(t). Accordingly the future evolution of the price
itself will be correlated with these pieces of information,
hence the need for conditional averages.
In the original Minority Game [14], the agents are given
pieces of information about the last price returns. The
agents in this game are therefore technical analysists.
More specifically, the public pattern µ at time t con-
sists in the signs of the past M price returns; therefore
in the original Minority Game, µ(t) can be seen as a
binary string of length M (µ(t) = 1, · · · , 2M ). Interest-
ingly, Ref. [30] showed that the averaged price fluctua-
tions are mostly unchanged if µ is chosen randomly from
{1, · · · , 2M}. On the other hand crashes extending over
several time-steps only occur if the patterns encode the
real price history [31].
Here we will only consider random patterns. Since the
agents act conditionally upon a given pattern µ(t) at time
t and are forced to trade at each time step, a strategy a
is a function which maps the pattern µ onto a trading
action aµ = +1 or −1 for each pattern µ = 1, · · · , P .
Strategies can hence be viewed as P -dimensional vec-
tors with binary entries. We will assume that each agent
holds two such strategies, which are assigned at random
at the start of the game and are then kept fixed [44].
Following the now standard formalism, we denote the
the strategy used by agent i at time step t by si(t) = ±1,
so that upon presentation of pattern µ(t) at t his ac-
tion will read ai(t) = a
µ(t)
si(t)
. This can be written as
ai(t) = ω
µ(t)
i + si(t)ξ
µ(t)
i where ω
µ
i =
1
2 (a
µ
i,1 + a
µ
i,−1) and
ξµi =
1
2 (a
µ
i,1 − aµi,−1). The excess demand at time t can
then be decomposed as follows:
A(t) = Ωµ(t) +
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i si(t), (12)
where Ωµ =
∑N
i=1 ω
µ
i .
In order to decide which of his two strategies to play
each agents assigns a virtual score to each of his strate-
gies, based on the payoff he would have obtained had he
always played this particular strategy. In the case where
the agents have two strategies, only the score difference
qi matters, and evolves according to
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t) + 2φiξ
µ(t)
i A(t)/P. (13)
As in Eq. (6), φi = ±1 describes the nature of the trader.
At time t, agent i then plays strategy si(t) = sgn qi(t).
This is the so-called online version of the game, where
the agents adapt their scores after every round of the
game. It was observed that the qualitative behaviour
of the model does not change much if one allows the
agents to switch strategies only after a large number of
rounds have been played [32]. This effectively amounts
to sampling all the patterns µ = 1, · · · , P and leads to
5the so-called batch version of the game:
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t) +
2
P
φi
P∑
µ=1

ξµi

Ωµ + N∑
j=1
ξµj sj(t)



 ,
(14)
which is much less demanding to study analytically than
the online game [33, 34]. Note that the time t in Eq.
(14) is not the same as that of Eq. (13), as it has been
rescaled by a factor P to take into account the fact that
the agents are allowed to switch strategies once every P
’online’ time-steps.
The statistical mechanics analysis of the minority game
has revealed a phase transition between a predictable and
an unpredictable phase. The relevant control parameter
is the ratio α = P/N between the number of different
patterns P and the number of players N . For α < αc ≈
0.33 the market is unpredictable so that H as defined
above vanishes. This is illustrated in the upper panels of
Figs 2 and 5. For α > αc one finds H > 0 so that the
knownledge of µ(t) is enough to predict the next price
return [35].
Online games
The setup of the online game makes it possible to com-
pare the price return auto-correlation function C(τ), with
K(τ), the conditional price return auto-correlation func-
tion as defined in Eq. (3).
Both auto-correlation functions are negative for τ = 1,
as the minority game induces a mean-reverting process
([23, 36]). The lower panel of Fig. 2 illustrates that the
conditional correlation function K(1) is much larger than
the unconditional one C(1) for all values of α. Note in
particular that C(1) is close to zero in the predictable
phase (H > 0) (and converges to 0 in the limit of in-
finite systems), whereas K(1) ≃ −0.5, confirming that
unconditional measures fail to detect existing arbitrage
opportunities which can only be revealed by conditional
approaches. Fixing P/N and plotting C(τ) and K(τ) as
a function of the time-lag τ confirms this statement (see
Figs. 3 and 4); when θ decreases, the mean reversion
of the price decreases because the fraction of minority
players becomes less and less important; accordingly the
amplitude of K decreases as well, and converges to 0
when θ = 1, since in that case the agents are all majority
players, and only play one of their strategies, which does
not produce any fluctuation of A around 〈A|µ〉. When
H = 0, as α → 0, K(1) → −1 for sufficiently large θ,
meaning that for a given µ, A acquires an oscillatory be-
haviour. This type of predictability is not captured by
H , but by K(1), and, to a much lesser extent, by C(1).
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FIG. 2: Predictability H (upper panel), and conditional one-
step autocorrelation function K(1) vs α = P/N for the online
game and different values of θ (open symbols). The uncon-
ditional one-step auto-correlation C(1) is close to zero for all
values of α and θ, and is shown in the lower panel for θ = 1
(full circles). The vertical dashed line marks the transition
between unpredictable and predictable states for the pure mi-
nority game (θ = 1). Simulations were performed on systems
of N = 500 agents, run for 106 on-line time-steps, results are
averaged over 20 random assignments of the strategies.
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θ=0.7 
FIG. 3: Unconditional and conditional price return autocor-
relation functions C and K vs time-lag τ for the online game
at α = 0.1 and for different values of θ. The upper curves
are C(τ ), the lower K(τ ). Results are from simulations of the
online game with N = 500 agents, run for 106 time-steps and
averaged over 10 random assignments of the strategies.
Batch games
The setup of the batch game allows only the mea-
surement of K(τ), the conditional price return auto-
correlation function (3), because A is replaced by its
weighted sum over the patterns in Eq. (14). Fig. 5
shows that the behaviour of K(1) as a function of α is
qualitatively the same as in the online game (Fig. 2).
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FIG. 4: Conditional price return autocorrelation function
K vs time-lag τ for the online game at α = 0.75 and for
different values of θ. The unconditional correlation function
C(τ ) is indistinguishable from zero on this scale. Results are
from simulations of the online game with N = 300 agents, run
for 106 time-steps and averaged over 10 random assignments
of the strategies
However, K(τ) itself is very different in batch games, as
it oscillates as function of τ (Fig. 6). This is a signature
of the mean-reverting process induced by the Minority
Game players, and of the batch process, which updates
the scores with respect to all the patterns at the same
time.
The dynamics of the batch Minority Game was ana-
lyzed in Ref. [33], where it is proved that the N coupled
equations (14) can be replaced, in the limit of N → ∞,
P →∞ at fixed α = P/N , by a single equation describ-
ing the evolution of a representative agent. This result
relies on the so-called generating functional analysis, a
technique originally devised to study neural networks and
other disordered systems [37]. This method consists in
averaging the dynamics over the disorder (i.e. over all
possible strategy assignments) and is exact. The result-
ing equation reads
q(t+1) = q(t)+αφ
∑
t′≤t
(11+G)−1tt′ sgn(q(t
′))+θ(t)+
√
αη(t),
(15)
where φ = ±1 again distinguishes between majority
and minority traders. While the original batch game
is Markovian, this equation contains two different types
of memory: a retarded self-interaction term (the second
term in the above equation) relating to earlier times t′ ≤ t
and coloured Gaussian noise η(t) with temporal covari-
ances
〈η(t)η(t′)〉 =
[
(11 +G)−1(E + C)(11 +GT )−1
]
tt′
. (16)
The correlation function Ctt′ = 〈sgn(q(t))sgn(q(t′))〉
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FIG. 5: Predictability (upper panel) and one-step autocorre-
lation function K(1) (lower panel) vs α for the batch game at
different values of θ. Data displayed as open symbols are ob-
tained from numerical simulations of the batch process with
N = 300 players, run for 100 time-steps and averaged over 30
realizations of the strategy assignments. The solid lines are
results from the Monte-Carlo integration of the self-consistent
theory, displayed for comparison (60 time-steps of the integra-
tion are performed, and results are averages over 2 · 105 sam-
ples of the effective agent process). The vertical dashed line
marks the transition between unpredictable and predictable
states for the case of the pure minority game (θ = 1).
and response function Gtt′ = 〈∂sgn(q(t))∂θ(t′) 〉 to external per-
turbations θ(t) are to be computed self-consistently as
averages over the noise. 11 is the identity matrix, and E
has all entries equal to one, Ett′ = 1.
Because of the non-Markovian nature of the single
agent process and the presence of coloured noise a full
analytical solution of this self-consistent problem is in
general impossible. Assuming independence from initial
conditions q(0), the predictabilityH can be computed ex-
actly, but the calculation of quantities like the volatility
〈A2〉 or one-step correlation functions requires the knowl-
edge of both the persistent and transient parts of the cor-
relation and response functions. Neglecting correlations
leads to accurate approximations for the market volatility
[33], but unsurprisingly analogous approximations are in-
adequate for the computation of price return correlation
functions. One therefore has to resort to a Monte-Carlo
integration of Eq. (15), and as shown in Fig. 5 we find
nearly perfect agreement with simulations of the original
batch process. The figure also illustrates that the be-
haviour of the conditional one-step correlation function
is very similar in batch and online minority games. Fig. 6
reports the behaviour of the conditional auto-correlation
as a function of the time lag τ from Monte-Carlo simu-
lations. One observes an oscillatory behaviour for small
τ , the oscillation amplitude can be reasonably well fitted
by exp
(−τβ/κ), with some constant κ.
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FIG. 6: Autocorrelation function K(τ ) vs τ for the batch
Minority Game at α = P/N = 1 obtained by Monte-Carlo
simulations of Eq. (15), the iteration is performed for 60 time-
steps and sampled over 2 · 105 single effective agent paths.
CONCLUSIONS
We have used agent-based models to illustrate the dif-
ferences between conditional and unconditional price re-
turn auto-correlation functions in financial markets. Un-
conditional indicators may be zero even though condi-
tional measures reveal very large correlations. This em-
phasizes the inappropriateness of the use of purely un-
conditional auto-correlation functions for weak proofs of
market efficiency. Therefore, a more correct statement
about market efficiency would be that they are remark-
ably efficient on average (over patterns, over time), but
not locally in time [38] or given relevant market states.
As noted above, practitioners try to identify patterns
µ in real markets and exploit resulting predictability
in order to make profit. The non-parametric cluster-
ing method recently developed by Marsili for example
[39] automatically extracts a set of patterns from mar-
ket data, which are at borderline of being predictive.
It would be interesting to compute price return auto-
correlation functions, conditional on patterns obtained
by this method.
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